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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes on on appeal
from an order of the district court dated
and entered on October 21, 2003, barring
US Airways, Inc. (“US Airways” or the
“Company”) from using an outside
contractor to perform maintenance
overhauls called S-Checks, mandated by
the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”), on the Company’s narrow body
Airbus aircraft.  The district court
concluded that the dispute between US
Airways and the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (the “IAM”) over whether such
subcontracting was permissible
constituted a major dispute under the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq. (“RLA”).1  For the reasons set forth
below, we hold that the dispute is a
minor one under the RLA, and therefore
the district court lacked jurisdiction to
issue the preliminary injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
A.  Factual Background
The IAM is an unincorporated
labor organization that is the certified
collective bargaining representative of
US Airways’ mechanics and related
personnel.  District Lodge 141-M is the
IAM’s negotiating arm.  For more than
50 years, the IAM and US Airways have
been parties to collective bargaining
agreements governing US Airways’
mechanics and related employees.  On
August 11, 2002, US Airways filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and implemented
measures to reduce its operating costs. 
These measures included renegotiating
the terms of its collective bargaining
agreements, rejecting certain aircraft
leases, rejecting real property leases,
reducing wages and benefits for its
management and non-union employees,
and rejecting or renegotiating other
agreements with its lessors, vendors, and
suppliers.  
1.  The S-Check Requirement
FAA guidelines require US
Airways to perform S-Checks on its
narrow body Airbus aircraft every five
years.  S-Checks are the most extensive
type of scheduled maintenance checks,
requiring a detailed inspection of the
    1The Railway Labor Act has covered
the airline industry since 1936.  See
Independent Ass’n of Continental Pilots
v. Continental Airlines, 155 F.3d 685,
689 (3d Cir. 1998).
3aircraft and repair of any discrepancies
on the airframe, components, and
engines.  US Airways’ first S-Check (on
an aircraft it acquired in 1998) became
due on October 15, 2003.  US Airways
had nine other S-Checks due by the end
of 2003 and seven others are due in
September 2004.  As of January 2005, S-
Checks will be required on an ongoing
basis. 
US Airways emerged from
bankruptcy on March 31, 2003.  It claims
that until that time it could not properly
arrange for the ten S-Checks that were
due in 2003.  At some point before
October 6, 2003, US Airways told the
IAM that it may need to hire a vendor to
perform the S-Checks because it lacked
the necessary equipment and facilities to
perform them itself.  On October 6, 2003,
US Airways confirmed this need with the
IAM with regard to its first ten S-
Checks, but it said it would work with
the IAM to identify means by which the
remaining S-Checks could be performed
in house. 
2.  The Collective Bargaining      
              Agreement (“CBA”)
a.  The Scope Clause (Article
2(B))
Article 2(B) of the CBA defines
the scope of the work to be performed by
IAM-represented employees:
The Company agrees
that the following
described work,
wherever performed, is
recognized as coming
within the jurisdiction
of the [IAM], and is
covered by this
Agreement:   . . . all
work involved in
dismantling,
overhauling, repairing,
fabricating, assembling,
welding, and erecting
all parts of airplanes,
airplane engines,
avionics equipment,
electrical system,
heating system,
hydraulic system, and
machine tool work in
connection therewith . .
. . 
. . . . 
The duties of aircraft
cleaning, lavatory
servicing, potable water
servicing, receipt and
dispatch, ancillary
duties associated with
receipt and dispatch,
and operation of ground
power units may be
performed by
employees covered by
this Agreement and/or
other employees and
vendors as described in
Article 4 paragraphs J
and N at those
4locations/shifts where
such covered
employees are not
staffed.  Aircraft towing
may be performed by
employees not covered
by this Agreement at
those locations/shifts
where such covered
employees are not
staffed.  It is not the
intent of this paragraph
to have non-Mechanical
and Related employees
perform such work on
shifts where covered
employees are staffed
except as provided for
elsewhere in this
agreement.  It is the
Company’s intent,
however, to utilize all
its equipment and
facilities in performing
work in its own
organization.  In the
event that a situation
should develop
whereby the equipment
and facility limitations
are not available or
sufficient to perform
such work, the
Company will confer
with the Union in an
effort to reach an
understanding with
respect to how the
problem is to be
resolved.  Receipt and
dispatch, including the
ancillary duties
associated with receipt
and dispatch, of
Commuter Aircraft may
be accomplished by
employees not covered
by the mechanic and
related agreement.
JA 170; Appellees’ br. at 7.2  The parties
do not dispute that the scope language
encompasses airframe heavy
maintenance (“HMV”) work, which is
the type of work an S-Check requires.  
There are two addenda to the
CBA:  (1) the “Letter of Clarification”
(the “First Clarification”); and (2)
“Clarification of Article 2(B)” (the
“Second Clarification”). 
b. The First Clarification
The First Clarification states that
“Section (B) of said Article 2 is
recognized by both parties as prohibiting
the ‘farming out’ of the types of work
specified in said Section (B).”  JA 194.  
c. The Second Clarification
The Second Clarification states
that:
Relative to [the Scope
    2References to “JA” refer to the joint
appendix filed in this court.
5clause], it is agreed that,
within the limits
hereinafter specified,
the following listed
exceptions to the
coverage of Article 2
shall not be deemed in
violation thereof:
. . . 
(G) Types of work
customarily contracted
out, such as parts and
material which the
Company could not be
expected to
manufacture, such as
engine and airframe
parts, castings,
cowlings, seats, wheels
and other items which
are commonly
manufactured as
standard items for the
trade by vendors.  Work
subcontracted out to a
vendor will be of the
type that cannot be
manufactured or
repaired in-house by
existing
skills/equipment or
facilities of the
Company.
. . . . 
(I) Due to lack of
facilities, the Company
may subcontract the
major overhaul of
aircraft engines during
the life of this
Agreement.  
JA 195-96.  The IAM notes that neither
HMV nor other maintenance work on
aircraft airframes is mentioned in the list
of subcontracting “exceptions.”  The
parties agree that HMV work is not the
type of work that customarily has been
contracted out. 
3.  Bargaining History
The IAM presents to the court
past conduct on the part of US Airways
regarding the subcontracting of HMV
work on its Boeing fleet.  Specifically,
the IAM notes that during negotiations in
1999 for a successor agreement (a major
dispute), US Airways sought to obtain
the right to subcontract Q-Checks of its
Boeing fleet, claiming that it lacked the
facilities to perform the work.  The IAM
rejected US Airways’ proposal, and thus,
US Airways did not achieve the right to
subcontract the Q-Checks.  
4.  The Parties’ Practice
US Airways never has
subcontracted HMV work in its 54-year
relationship with the IAM.  Rather, IAM-
represented employees always have
performed such work, regardless of the
model of the aircraft.  The IAM claims
that the Company acquired a hangar in
Tampa, Florida, where it could have
6performed the S-Checks, although it
voluntarily closed the facility in
November 2002. 
5.  The Dunsford Arbitration
US Airways presents evidence
of an arbitration between it and the IAM
in 1991-1992 before the US Airways-
IAM System Board of
Adjustment/Arbitration  (“System
Board”) which Professor John Dunsford
decided (the “Dunsford Arbitration”). 
The issue before the System Board was
whether US Airways could outsource
engine overhaul work because it lacked
the facilities to perform the work in
house.   Professor Dunsford decided that
it could, noting that the IAM had not met
its burden of showing that there were
facilities to do the work in house.  While
the parties agree that this award has
become part of the CBA, they dispute its
meaning.  US Airways claims that
Professor Dunsford relied on the second
sentence of Section (G) of the Second
Clarification in holding that even though
the engine overhaul work customarily
had not been contracted out, US Airways
could do so in that case because it lacked
the facilities to do the work in house.  In
contrast, the IAM believes that Professor
Dunsford relied solely on Section (I),
which creates a specific exception for
aircraft engine overhauling where there
is a lack of facilities.
B.  Procedural Background
On August 4, 2003, the IAM
notified US Airways that use of an
outside vendor for the S-Checks would
violate the scope of the CBA and would
create a major dispute.  US Airways
countered on August 8, 2003, that
because the parties differed as to the
interpretation of the CBA regarding
whether S-Checks could be
subcontracted, the dispute was a minor
one.  Thus, US Airways attempted to
submit the dispute to the System Board,
but the IAM refused to arbitrate the
dispute. 
On October 6, 2003, the IAM
moved in the district court for a
temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction barring US
Airways from using an outside vendor
for the S-Checks.3  The IAM argued that
the CBA required US Airways to use
IAM employees for its S-Checks and that
use of an outside vendor constituted a
    3The IAM included in its supporting
papers declarations explaining how US
Airways could perform the Airbus HMV
work in house with existing facilities,
equipment, and mechanics, both active
and on layoff status.  It also provided a
declaration from William Freiberger,
who was the IAM’s chief negotiator in
the 1999 negotiations, in which he stated
that during the course of the 1999
negotiations US Airways had negotiated
for the right to subcontract HMV work
on its Boeing fleet, but never attained
that right.
7major dispute, requiring maintenance of
the status quo. 
After oral argument, the district
court held on October 21, 2003, that the
dispute was a major one and it
preliminarily enjoined US Airways from
using an outside vendor for the S-
Checks.  It held that US Airways’
arguments under the CBA were
“obviously insubstantial” and that it was
“attempting to remake or amend” the
CBA’s prohibition against HMV
subcontracting.  JA 18.  
US Airways filed a notice of
appeal and a motion for stay pending
appeal.  After a hearing, the district court
denied US Airways’ request for a stay,
but it modified its injunction to permit
US Airways to complete work on one
partially disassembled aircraft.  On
October 27, 2003, US Airways moved in
this court for an emergency stay pending
appeal, which a motion panel denied on
November 5, 2003, though at the same
time it expedited the appeal.  On January
12, 2004, we heard oral argument on US
Airways’ appeal.
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Jurisdiction over the appeal of a
preliminary injunction is proper pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  We exercise
plenary review over the question of
whether the dispute is a major or minor
one.  See General Comm. of Adjustment
v. CSX R.R. Corp., 893 F.2d 584, 589
(3d Cir. 1990) (“CSX”).  We review
factual findings under the clearly
erroneous standard.  See Shire US Inc. v.
Barr Labs. Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 352 (3d
Cir. 2003).
III.  DISCUSSION
A. Major vs. Minor Disputes
1.  The Guidelines
“The Railway Labor Act is the
product of a joint effort by labor and
management representatives to channel
labor disputes into constructive
resolution procedures as a means of
avoiding interruptions to commerce and
preventing strikes.”  CSX, 893 F.2d at
589.  The two types of disputes that can
arise under the RLA are major disputes
and minor disputes.  In Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 109 S.Ct. 2477
(1989) (“Conrail”), the Supreme Court
explained that “the formal demarcation
between major and minor disputes does
not turn on a case-by-case determination
of the importance of the issue presented
or the likelihood that it would prompt the
exercise of economic self-help.”  Id. at
305, 109 S.Ct. at 2481.  Rather, the
difference between the two types of
disputes is that major disputes seek to
create contractual rights, while minor
disputes seek to enforce them.  See id. at
8302, 109 S.Ct. at 2480 (holding that the
inclusion of drug testing as part of
railroad’s physical examinations
arguably was justified by implied terms
of collective bargaining agreement, and
therefore dispute was minor); see also
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1290 (1945).  
Major disputes relate to the
formation of collective bargaining
agreements or efforts to secure them. 
They arise in the absence of such an
agreement or where a party seeks to
change the terms of one, and therefore
the issue is not whether an existing
agreement controls the controversy. 
Major disputes look to the acquisition of
rights for the future, not to the assertion
of rights claimed to have vested in the
past.  See Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302, 109
S.Ct. at 2480.  As the Supreme Court
stated in Conrail, 
[i]n the event of a major
dispute, the RLA
requires the parties to
undergo a lengthy
process of bargaining
and mediation. . . . 
Until they have
exhausted those
procedures, the parties
are obligated to
maintain the status quo,
and the employer may
not implement the
contested change in
rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions. 
The district courts have
subject-matter
jurisdiction to enjoin a
violation of the status
quo pending completion
of the required
procedures, without the
customary showing of
irreparable injury.
Id. at 302-03, 109 S.Ct. at 2480.
In contrast, minor disputes arise
out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of existing
collective bargaining agreements.  See
id. at 303, 109 S.Ct. at 2481.  “The
dispute relates either to the meaning or
proper application of a particular
provision with reference to a specific
situation or to an omitted case.”  Id. 
Where an employer asserts a contractual
right to take the contested action, the
ensuing dispute is a minor one if the
action arguably is justified by the implied
or express terms of the parties’ collective
bargaining agreement.  Where, by
contrast, the employer’s claimed
justification for the action is frivolous or
obviously insubstantial, the dispute is a
major one.  See id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at
2484; see also CSX, 893 F.2d at 593
(noting that the court may not “consider
the merits of the underlying dispute; its
role is limited to determining whether the
dispute can be characterized as involving
the proper application or meaning of a
contract provision”). 
A minor dispute is subject to a
9compulsory and binding arbitration
before an adjustment board established
by the employer and the unions
representing the employees.  That board,
in this case the System Board, has
exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. 
There is no general statutory obligation
that the employer maintain the status quo
pending the arbitrator’s decision.  See
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302, 109 S.Ct. at
2481.  Thus, in a minor dispute, “[e]ach
side can act on its interpretation of the
existing agreements until the arbitration
panel rules otherwise.”  CSX, 893 F.2d at
594 (citations omitted).
2.  The Instant Dispute
We hold that the instant dispute
is a minor one because both parties have
asserted rights existing under the CBA,
the dispute turns on the proper
interpretation or application of the CBA,
and US Airways’ argument is neither
frivolous nor obviously insubstantial.
a.  Both Parties Assert Rights
Under the CBA
Both parties contend that the
terms of the existing CBA either
establish or refute the presence of the
right to subcontract S-Checks.  The IAM
contends that the dispute can be resolved
by reference to the following:  (1) the
scope clause (Article 2(B)) (which
includes HMV work); (2) the First
Clarification (which prohibits the
“farming out” of work included in the
scope clause); (3) the Second
Clarification (which does not contain an
exception for HMV work); and (4) US
Airways’ past practice of performing all
HMV work in house.
In US Airways’ view, the
dispute can be resolved by reference to
the following: (1) the scope clause
(Article 2(B)) (which includes HMV
work); (2) the “facilities and equipment”
clause of Article 2(B) (which contains a
meet and confer obligation when the
Company lacks adequate equipment or
facilities to perform the work); (3) the
Second Clarification, Section (G),
second sentence (which states that US
Airways may contract out work for
which it lacks the skills, equipment or
facilities to perform the work in house);
(4) the Dunsford Award (upholding right
to subcontract engine overhaul work
when in house facilities are lacking); (5)
the past practice of subcontracting
aircraft maintenance work when in house
equipment or facilities are lacking; and
(6) the absence of any past practice of
performing Airbus S-Checks.
Thus, both parties contend that
terms of the CBA, as interpreted through
custom and past experience, determine
the result in this case. 
b. US Airways’ Argument is
Neither Frivolous Nor
Obviously Insubstantial
As described below, we hold
that the district court erred in finding US
Airways’ position to be frivolous and
10
obviously insubstantial.
1.  US Airways’ Section (G)
Argument
Section G of the Second
Clarification reads as follows:
(G) Types of work
customarily contracted
out, such as parts and
material which the
Company could not be
expected to
manufacture, such as
engine and airframe
parts, castings,
cowlings, seats, wheels
and other items which
are commonly
manufactured as
standard items for the
trade by vendors.  Work
subcontracted out to a
vendor will be of the
type that cannot be
manufactured or
repaired in-house by
existing
skills/equipment or
facilities of the
Company.
JA 196.  US Airways argues that the
second sentence of Section (G), read
alone, supports its position that any work
may be contracted out to a vendor when
the Company lacks the skills, equipment
or facilities to perform the work in
house.  In concluding that this sentence
“can only be read as a clarification of the
first sentence,”  JA 16, the district court
impermissibly interpreted the CBA.4  As
    4The district court based its decision
on the following factors: (1) the
“longstanding and uninterrupted
practice” of performing “heavy
maintenance types of work”; (2) the “fact
that such work has always been
considered within the exclusive province
of those employees . . . as evidenced by
the aforementioned history”; and (3) the
fact that US Airways in 1999 asked the
IAM to allow it to subcontract Q-Checks
on Boeing aircraft because of a backlog
of that work.  JA 17.   It further opined
that under US Airways’ interpretation of
Section (G), US Airways “could
unilaterally void the entire CBA based on
such interpretation simply by not
providing IAM-represented employees
with adequate facilities or tools to
perform their work.”  JA 17-18.  
With regard to the 1999 history,
US Airways argues that it did not have
an adequate opportunity to respond to the
IAM’s factual allegations, but that in any
event this past negotiation is
distinguishable because there US
Airways was seeking permission to
subcontract work for which it had
adequate equipment and facilities.  US
Airways correctly notes that the district
11
US Airways correctly explains, the
district court’s analysis went beyond
determining whether the CBA resolved
the dispute; instead, it performed the task
of the arbitrator in determining the
proper construction of Section (G).  Of
course, under US Airways’ view, the
district court’s action was impermissible
even if it correctly interpreted the CBA.
2.  US Airways’ Dunsford           
                   Award Argument
US Airways argues that the
Dunsford Award is indicative that the
second sentence of Section (G) is free
standing.  It claims that Professor
Dunsford concluded that engine overhaul
work customarily was not contracted out,
but nonetheless US Airways could
contract it out because it did not have the
facilities and equipment needed to
perform the work in house.  Thus, US
Airways argues that the second sentence
of Section (G) gives it authority to
contract out S-Checks where it lacks the
facilities and equipment to perform them
in house, even though this is not the type
of work customarily contracted out.  US
Airways also counters the IAM’s
argument that the Dunsford Award was
based solely on Section (I)5, and not on
Section (G), by stating that “[a]lthough
the IAM has argued that the Dunsford
Award was based on Section (I) of the
[Second Clarification], which applies
only to engine maintenance, that could
not have been the basis for the decision
because Section (I) refers only to lack of
‘facilities,’ and not lack of equipment or
skills.”  Appellant’s br. at 27.   
3. US Airways’ Equipment and 
Facilities Clause Argument
US Airways also argues that the
district court failed to acknowledge the
“equipment and facilities clause” of
Article 2(B), which states that “[i]n the
event that a situation should develop
whereby the equipment and facility
limitations are not available or sufficient
to perform such work, the Company will
confer with the Union in an effort to
reach an understanding with respect to
how the problem is to be resolved.”  JA
170.  US Airways argues that this clause
creates at least an implied right to
subcontract where the Company does not
have adequate equipment or facilities. 
US Airways further argues that under the
Dunsford Award, this clause applies
whenever work is covered by the
agreement (e.g. HMV work), and not
where the work is subject to an express
exception under the Second Clarification,
such as Section (G).  As such, itcourt’s reliance on this bargaining history
is attenuated given that the court did not
review the bargaining history of Section
(G).
    5Section (I) states as follows: “Due to
lack of facilities, the Company may
subcontract the major overhaul of aircraft
engines during the life of this
Agreement.”  JA 196.
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concludes that even if the second
sentence of Section (G) applied only to
work “customarily contracted out,” the
equipment and facilities clause of Article
2(B) “creates an independent basis for
the Company’s right to subcontract S-
Checks.”  Appellant’s br. at 31.
Based on these arguments, we
hold that US Airways has met its
“relatively light” burden, see Conrail,
491 U.S. at 307, 109 S.Ct. 2482 (citation
omitted), of asserting rights under the
CBA that are neither frivolous nor
obviously insubstantial.  But we do not
go further and state a view as to whether
we ultimately agree with US Airways or
the IAM as it is not our responsibility to
make such a determination.  Rather, we
leave the merits of the parties’ arguments
to the System Board, and merely will lift
the preliminary injunction because there
is no requirement that the status quo be
maintained in this minor dispute.
IV.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the
order of the district court dated and
entered on October 21, 2003, will be
reversed and this matter will be
remanded to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SMITH, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
This case turns on whether the
dispute between US Airways, Inc. (“US
Airways” or “the Company”) and the
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (the “IAM”) is
characterized as “major” or “minor” for
purposes of the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (“RLA”).  The
majority holds that it is a minor one
“because both parties have asserted
rights existing under the [collective
bargaining agreement], the dispute turns
on the proper interpretation or
application of the CBA, and US
Airways’ argument is neither frivolous
nor obviously insubstantial.”  Supra at
13.   I agree with the majority that the
parties’ dispute is resolved by application
of the CBA and the interpretation of its
terms.  Where I part company with my
colleagues is in their conclusion that US
Airways’ position is not frivolous.  I
agree, instead, with the District Court
that, “[u]nder the guise of a claimed
dispute about meaning of language in the
CBA, [US Airways] is attempting to
remake or amend the most elemental and
consequential provisions of the CBA.” 
Because I believe that US Airways has
not presented a construction of the
contract that even arguably supports its
position, I respectfully dissent.
A genuine dispute over the
“‘meaning or proper application of a
particular provision’” in the parties’
13
collective bargaining agreement is
“minor,” and subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the System Board of
Adjustment.  Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry.
Labor Executives’ Ass’n (“Conrail”),
491 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1989) (quoting
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711, 723 (1945)).  A “major” dispute, on
the other hand, arises “where there is no
such agreement or where it is sought to
change the terms of one.”  Conrail, 491
U.S. at 302 (quoting Burley, 325 U.S. at
723) (emphasis added).  The RLA
prescribes “a lengthy process of
bargaining and mediation” for major
disputes, during which time the “parties
are obligated to maintain the status quo.” 
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302-03.  The district
courts have jurisdiction to enjoin a
violation of the status quo pending
completion of the required procedures,
without the customary showing of
irreparable injury.  Id. at 303. 
The Supreme Court in Conrail
explicitly recognized that any capable
advocate can massage an attempt to
change the terms of an agreement into a
question of contract interpretation, and
that deferring to every such argument as
a matter of course would undermine the
basic structure of the RLA: 
[T]here is a danger in
leaving the
characterization of the
dispute solely in the
hands of one party.  In a
situation in which the
party asserting a
contractual basis for its
claim is “insincere” in
doing so, or its
“position [is] founded
upon . . . insubstantial
grounds,” the result of
honoring that party’s
characterization would
be to undercut “the
prohibitions of § 2,
Seventh, and § 6 of the
Act” against unilateral
imposition of new
contractual terms.  In
such circumstances,
protection of the proper
functioning of the
statutory scheme
requires the court to
substitute its
characterization for that
of the claimant.  
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 306 (quoting
Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co.
v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34,
43-44 n.4 (4th Cir. 1957)).6  Under
    6  See also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 265-66 (1994)
(“Recognizing that accepting a party’s
characterization of a dispute as ‘minor’
ran the risk of undercutting the RLA’s
prohibition ‘against unilateral imposition
of new contractual terms,’ the Court [in
Conrail] held that a dispute would be
deemed minor only if there was a
14
Conrail, a dispute is minor only where
the parties’ positions are “arguably
justified” by the terms of their
agreement:
Where an employer
asserts a contractual
right to take the
contested action, the
ensuing dispute is
minor if the action is
arguably justified by the
terms of the parties’
collective-bargaining
agreement.  Where,
incontrast, the
employer’s claims are
frivolous or obviously
insubstantial, the
dispute is a major one.
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307.
In holding that the dispute
between the parties is minor rather than
major, the majority concludes that the
District Court “impermissibly interpreted
the CBA.”  Supra at 14.  Of course, the
District Court had no choice but to
interpret the CBA in order to determine
whether it arguably justifies US Airways’
position.  See Conrail, 491 U.S. at 306-
07; see also S.E. Penn. Transp. Auth.,
882 F.2d at 784-85 (discussing the
sources to be considered when
interpreting a CBA to determine whether
a party’s position is arguably justified). 
A court’s interpretation is impermissible
under Conrail only if it elects among
multiple, non-frivolous constructions of
the terms of the agreement.  By stating
that the District Court “impermissibly
interpreted the CBA,” the majority, it
seems to me, only invites the question:  is
US Airways’ position grounded on a
non-frivolous construction of the parties’
sincere, nonfrivolous argument that it
turned on the application of the existing
agreement, that is, if it was ‘arguably
justified’ by that agreement.”); S.E.
Penn. Transp. Auth. v. Bhd. of R.R.
Signalmen, 882 F.2d 778, 783 (3rd Cir.
1989) (explaining that the Conrail
standard should not “allow a party to
utilize the minor dispute resolution
procedures by simply pleading that the
dispute is resolvable by reference to an
existing collective bargaining
agreement” and that “courts can exercise
some judicial control over the label to be
affixed to the dispute”); Rutland Ry.
Corp. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 307
F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1962) (“In [deciding
if a dispute is major or minor] we must
not place undue emphasis on the
contentions or the maneuvers of the
parties. Management will assert that its
position, whether right or wrong, is only
an interpretation or application of the
existing contract. Unions, on the other
hand, in their assertions about the dispute
at issue, will obviously talk in terms of
change.”).
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agreement?7
The majority does not really
answer this question, but rather repeats
US Airways’ argument that “the second
sentence of Section (G), read alone,
supports its position that any work may
be contracted out to a vendor when the
Company lacks the skills, equipment or
facilities to perform the work in house.” 
Supra at 14; compare Appellant’s Br. at
22.  Yet two critical issues remain: (1)
whether the second sentence of Section
(G), read alone, arguably supports US
Airways’ position, and (2) whether that
sentence can arguably be read alone?  
I believe that both issues must
be resolved in the negative.  US
Airways’ interpretation of the second
sentence of Section (G) hinges on a
logical fallacy.  That sentence states:
“Work subcontracted out to a vendor will
be of the type that cannot be
manufactured or repaired in-house by
existing skills/equipment or facilities of
the Company.”  From this, US Airways
argues: (1) S-Checks cannot be repaired
in-house using existing equipment and
facilities; (2) therefore, S-Checks are
work that can be subcontracted out.  Yet
this argument is a classic non sequitur.  It
is as if US Airways had argued: (1) All
precedential opinions of the Third Circuit
will be of the type published in the
Federal Reporter; (2) Rutland Railway
Corp. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962), is
published in the Federal Reporter; (3)
therefore, Rutland is a precedential
opinion of the Third Circuit.  
US Airways’ argument would be
valid (and therefore arguable) if the
second sentence of Section (G) actually
read: “Work of the type that cannot be
manufactured or repaired in-house by
existing skills/equipment or facilities of
the Company will be subcontracted out
to a vendor.”8  This is not the language of
the text, however, and US Airways offers
no argument or explanation why we
    7  I take issue with the majority’s
characterization that the District Court
“based its decision” on the parties’ past
practice and bargaining history.  Supra at
14-15 n.4.  The District Court simply
read the CBA and concluded—as I
do—that it lends no support to US
Airways’ position.  Having arrived at
what it concluded was the only arguable
interpretation of the CBA, the District
Court went on to state that it had
“confidence” in its conclusion based on
the parties’ past practice and bargaining
history.  To the extent that these sources
were considered by the District Court,
they were used merely to confirm the
plain text of the CBA, not to interpret the
CBA in the first instance.
    8  Likewise, the hypothetical
conclusion given above would be valid if
the first premise stated:  “All opinions of
the type published in the Federal
Reporter will be precedential opinions of
the Third Circuit.”
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should reverse the subject and predicate
of the second sentence of Section (G). 
The Company simply presents the
implicit and fallacious ipse dixit that this
is how the sentence should be read.  Such
argumentation is, in my view, obviously
insubstantial.
Whether S-Checks can be
performed using existing
skills/equipment therefore tells the reader
little about whether S-Checks can be
outsourced.  Indeed, the second sentence
of Section (G), standing alone, provides
no basis for determining what work may
be outsourced.  Which leads to the
second issue that I believe the majority
has left unresolved:  can the second
sentence of Section (G) arguably be read
standing alone?  In my view, the District
Court was correct in concluding that it
cannot.  That sentence states  that
“[w]ork subcontracted out to a vendor
will be of” a certain type.  It therefore
has no practical meaning without a prior
definition of “[w]ork subcontracted out.” 
The second sentence of Section (G) thus
can be read only as a clarification of the
first sentence, which, as an enumerated
exception to Article 2(B)’s requirement
that work be performed in-house,
provides such a definition.  That is, the
second sentence clarifies the “[t]ypes of
work customarily contracted out” that
will continue to be contracted out under
the CBA.   
All of this is apparent from the
plain language of the CBA.  It is also
clear from the System Board of
Adjustment’s opinion in the Dunsford
Arbitration, which US Airways insists is
part of the CBA and binding on the
parties.  See supra at 8.  As the majority
points out, the issue before the System
Board in the Dunsford Arbitration was
whether US Airways could outsource
certain engine overhaul work because it
lacked the facilities to perform the work
in-house.  US Airways attempted to
justify the outsourcing under Sections
(G) and (I) of the Second Clarification. 
The Board held that Section (G) did not
authorize outsourcing because US
Airways had performed similar engine
overhaul work in-house:
Although the Company
has never overhauled a
CFM-56 engine in
house, it has performed
overhaul work on [a
different] series of
engines since the early
1970s.  Hence, the
“type” of work which is
in arbitration is the
work of engine
overhaul, no [sic] the
overhaul of a particular
engine.  . . . If work on
the new part is of a
“type” that previously
was performed on other
parts, it does not come
within the exception of
[Section]  (G). . . . 
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. . . The quantity of
work [that US Airways]
has done on [similar
engines] over many
years is quite
substantial, and clearly
establishes that this
“type of work” is not
customarily contracted
out.
(Emphasis added).  The System Board’s
opinion reiterates the only arguable
reading of the CBA:  the Section (G)
exception is limited to “[t]ypes of work
customarily contracted out.”9 
Again, all of this is clear from
the CBA.  More important for purposes
of the RLA, however, is the fact that US
Airways offers no explanation for how
the second sentence of Section (G)
supports its position, or how its
construction of that sentence can be
harmonized with the rest of the contract. 
Having adopted a logically invalid
conclusion from the text of the CBA;
having contradicted a dispositive
decision of the System Board; having
ignored the elementary canon that a
contract must be read as a whole, and
that individual provisions must be read in
    9  The Board did conclude that
outsourcing was authorized under
Section (I), which provides:  “Due to
lack of facilities, the Company may
subcontract the major overhaul of aircraft
engines during the life of this
Agreement.” US Airways’ argument that
there is an  inconsistency between the
Board opinion and Section (I) is a red
herring.  Because the Board explicitly
found Section (G) inapplicable, any
inconsistency can only have relevance to
the meaning of Section (I).  In other
words, Section (I) may very well apply
due to lack of equipment and skills as
well as “due to lack of facilities.”  But
this is irrelevant to the dispute at hand,
because US Airways does not contend
that Section (I) justifies the outsourcing
of S-Checks. 
US Airways takes liberties with
the Dunsford Arbitration that are simply
unsupportable.  The System Board
addressed US Airways’ arguments under
Sections (G) and (I) in succession.  In its
33-page opinion, the Board disposed of
US Airways’ Section (G) argument in
just over a single page.  The System
Board devoted the remaining seven
pages of its opinion to US Airways’
Section (I) argument (Section (G) is not
mentioned again in the opinion).  It is in
this context that the Board stated:  “the
operative standard in the relationship of
the parties has been whether the
Company possessed the requisite skills,
equipment and facilities to do certain
engine overhaul work.”  (Emphasis
added).  Of course, US Airways in its
brief conveniently omits the italicized
portion of this quote, which places the
Board’s allegedly inconsistent statement
squarely in the context of Section (I).  
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their context and not in a vacuum, see In
re New Valley Corp., 89 F.3d 143, 149
(3d Cir. 1996); having abandoned the
equally fundamental canon that a
contract must be read so as to give effect
to all of its parts, see New Wrinkle, Inc.
v. John L. Armitage & Co., 238 F.2d 753,
757 (3d Cir. 1956)10; US Airways was
obliged to offer some logical argument
why its interpretation makes sense.  No
such argument was attempted by US
Airways, and this failure should be fatal
under Conrail. 
Instead, US Airways puts forth
an alternative argument that the
“equipment and facilities” clause in
Article 2(B) is actually an exception to
Article 2(B)’s requirement that work be
performed in-house.  Not only is this
alternative argument frivolous, it
confirms the absence of any justification
for US Airways’ Section (G) argument. 
The “equipment and facilities” clause
provides:
It is the Company’s
intent, however, to
utilize all its equipment
and facilities in
performing work in its
own organization.  In
the event that a
situation should
develop whereby the
equipment and facility
limitations are not
available or sufficient
to perform such work,
the Company will
confer with the Union
in an effort to reach an
understanding with
respect to how the
problem is to be
resolved.  
This clause does not purport to allow US
Airways to take any unilateral action at
all.  Instead, it simply requires the parties
to “confer.”  The System Board of
Adjustment made this very point in the
Dunsford Arbitration, rejecting US
Airways’ reliance on the equipment and
facilities clause as outsourcing authority. 
US Airways thus attempts to revive two
arguments explicitly rejected by the
System Board, while at the same time
insisting that the Dunsford Arbitration is
part of the CBA and binding on the
parties.  See supra at 8.   Rather than
support a broad right to outsource, the
“equipment and facilities” clause
demonstrates that the parties
contemplated a variety of situations in
    10  US Airways’ construction of the
CBA renders Section (I) of the Second
Clarification superfluous.  If, as US
Airways argues, the second sentence in
Section (G) allows US Airways to
outsource all work that cannot be
performed due to lack of facilities, there
would be no need for a separate Section
(I) specifically dealing with the
outsourcing of engine overhaul work
“[d]ue to lack of facilities.”
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which “equipment and facility limitations
are not available or sufficient,” but
restricted US Airways’ right to outsource
to certain narrowly defined situations.
I see this situation as similar to
that confronted by the Seventh Circuit in
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway Co., 138 F.3d 635 (7th Cir.
1997).  The dispute in that case was
whether the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement required the railroads to
compensate maintenance workers for
travel expenses.  Id. at 638.  According
to the union, the CBA obligated the
railroads to compensate all traveling
employees, whereas the railroads insisted
that their obligation was limited to
reimbursing “regional and system
gangs.”  Id.  The CBA, however, simply
referred to “employees.”  Id. at 640.  The
Seventh Circuit rejected the railroads’
attempt to construe “employees”
narrowly:  
Either [parties’] view is
logically possible;
neither is barred by the
explicit terms of Article
XIV. But while the
term “employees” could
refer solely to regional
and system gangs, there
is no hint in Article
XIV that “employees”
actually bears the
narrower meaning. . . .
The railroads propose a
theoretically plausible
distinction, but one that
has no basis in the text.
We would hold the
railroads’ view
“frivolous or obviously
insubstantial” and
affirm the district
court—if the act of
interpretation were to
stop at the four corners
of the Agreement.11
Id.  Unlike the railroads in Atchison, US
Airways has failed to show that its
arguments are even theoretically
plausible.  Rather, its Section (G)
    11  The court in Atchison nevertheless
found support for the railroad’s argument
in the parties’ bargaining history.  Id. at
640-43; see Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311
(stating that courts must consider both
implied and express terms of a CBA, as
well as the parties’ practice, usage, and
custom).  US Airways states that it relies
on the parties’ past practice of
subcontracting aircraft maintenance work
when in-house equipment or facilities are
lacking.  But the only “aircraft
maintenance work”  that US Airways
claims to have outsourced is the engine
overhaul work that was the subject of the
Dunsford Arbitration.   US Airways
“past practice” of doing something
explicitly authorized by Section (I)
provides no insight into the meaning of
Section (G) or Article 2(B). 
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argument is sophistry, condemned by US
Airways’ alternative—and equally
insubstantial—argument from Article
2(B).  
Ultimately, my disagreement
with the majority reflects a different
assessment of the meaning and purpose
of the “arguably justified” standard set
forth by the Supreme Court in Conrail
for distinguishing between major and
minor disputes.   Conrail, as I noted
above, explicitly recognized that any
good lawyer can plead a major dispute as
a question of contract interpretation, but
that parties cannot circumvent the RLA’s
status quo requirement with “frivolous,”
or “obviously insubstantial” arguments. 
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 306-07; see also
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v.
United Trans. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150
(1969) (“The Act’s status quo
requirement is central to its design. . . .
[T]he power which the Act gives the
other party to preserve the status quo for
a prolonged period will frequently make
it worth-while for the moving party to
compromise with the interests of the
other side and thus reach agreement
without interruption to commerce.”). 
Because I believe that the majority is
allowing the proffer of an argument, in
and of itself, to satisfy US Airways’
already “relatively light burden,”
Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307, I respectfully
dissent.
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